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Abstract
In a spatial model of voting, a voters utility for a candidate is a func-
tion of ideological distance from the candidate and a candidates quality.
Candidate quality can potentially bias the measure of ideological distance
in two ways. First, voters may be more drawn to high quality candidates
thereby reducing the ideological distance. Second, a candidates ideologi-
cal position is a function of rivalsqualities and his own quality. We derive
a theoretical model to sign the direction of both biases analytically. Next,
using techniques established in the industrial organization literature, we
estimate the model using two sets of instrumental variables.
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1 Introduction
New game-theoretic models of elections extend the standard Downsian model
to account for two components in a vote choice. The rst component is the
ideological distance between voters and candidates, a mainstay of the Downsian
model [Downs (1957)]. The second component is a voters perceived qualities of
the candidates, which summarizes all non-ideological factors a¤ecting the vote
choice, like competence, charisma and the moral attributes of the candidates.
A natural question in the light of these models is how important ideology is
in a vote choice. This paper identies two sources of omitted variable bias
when estimating a voters sensitivity to ideological di¤erence caused by treating
candidate quality as exogenous. First, high quality candidates may be more
persuasive than their rivals, thereby drawing voters closer to their policy position
and decreasing ideological distance. Next, a candidates observed policy position
is the result of a strategic encounter. Therefore, a candidates announced policy
position, in equilibrium, is a function of his rivalspolicy positions and qualities
as well as the candidates own quality. Our main contribution is to estimate the
extended Downsian model addressing these two biases.
The main parameters of interest are the relative weight of ideology to other
non-ideological factors in the vote choice, and the perceived qualities of the can-
didates. Two estimation challenges are addressed. First, the voters observed
ideology may be correlated with the unobserved perceived qualities of the can-
didates. Intuitively, a high quality candidate may be more persuasive than his
lower quality rivals leading voters to choose his position as "the right one." High
quality candidates are capable of drawing voters closer to their ideological po-
sition, thereby reducing the ideological distance. A naive estimation capturing
the weight of ideological distance in the voters choice may overstate the true
e¤ect. If the quality of the candidate is both unobserved and negatively corre-
1
lated with ideological distance, then a small di¤erence in ideology is overstated
in the voter utility function for high quality candidates.
The second estimation challenge addresses the correlation between candidate
quality and the announced policy position. If a candidate chooses his policy an-
nouncement strategically, then, in equilibrium, the candidates announcement
is a function of his rivalsqualities as well as his own. The expected direction of
the bias is dependent on the theoretical framework adopted. The game-theoretic
models by Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) and Aragones and Palfrey (2007),
together with simulations provided by Schoeld and Sened (2006) suggest that,
in equilibrium, candidates with quality advantages tend to locate closer to the
electoral center.1 In their theoretical framework, a naive estimation of the
model tends to exaggerate the true importance of ideology in the voters choice.
However, these studies assume that voters have identical perceptions of the
candidatesqualities, which is strongly rejected in our empirical analysis. For
this reason, we provide a new, simple game-theoretic model that better accom-
modates the data. In our model, voters are allowed to di¤er in their quality
perceptions. Also, candidates are allowed to microtarget their announcements
such that groups of voters with di¤erent quality perceptions receive a (some-
what) di¤erent message, at a certain cost to the candidate. Microtargeting is a
technique that tailors the electoral message to a subpopulation of voters based
on unique information about that group.2 The tailored message is delivered
using various means of communication, such as direct mail, phone calls, home
visits, radio ads, and television ads. Since communication is expensive, candi-
dates may nd it optimal to spend money only, or mainly, on voters with a high
rate of return. For example, a candidate may not nd it optimal to invest in
1A di¤erent result is obtained in Groseclose (2001) by assuming that candidates are both
o¢ ce motivated and policy motivated.
2Votersdemographic information can be obtained from consumer and demographic data-
banks.
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voters whose preferences match very well with his political platform, because
those voters are already likely to vote for him. Instead, the candidate can use
those resources to microtarget voters whose support he needs to win the election
and whose policy preferences are less congruent with his political platform. We
nd that candidates behave in this fashion in equilibrium within our theoretical
setting. The testable implication is that a naive estimation of the model tends
to understate the true importance of ideology in the voters choice, compared
to a model in which the omitted variable problem is resolved.
The endogeneity in voter ideology has been previously discussed in Degan
(2007), but the solution of the problem is out of the scope of her paper. To
the best of our knowledge, the endogeneity problem in candidates ideology
has not been addressed in the voting literature, despite being an analog to the
endogeneity of rm location and price in models of di¤erentiated products within
the industrial organization literature.3 The key insight is that the observed
position of a candidate (the location of a rm) results from the equilibrium
of a strategic interaction which has as primitives the quality of the candidates
(the attributes of the di¤erentiated products). Firms who produce high quality
products set higher prices. It should be no surprise that high-quality candidates
enjoy some strategic advantage, too.
This paper contributes to the voting literature in three ways. First, we iden-
tify a new omitted variable bias (in addition to the one pointed out in Degan
(2007)). Second, we present a formal model whose assumptions accommodate
the data and whose results give an unambiguous direction of the bias for the
new omitted variable bias. Third, we propose two sets of instrumental variables
to address both biases simultaneously, and estimate the model. Our empirical
estimates are in full agreement with the predictions of the theoretical framework
3 In response, the literature has provided estimation techniques focused on instrumenting
for price in the presence of unobserved product quality [Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn, and
Pakes (1995), Nevo (2000)].
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for both problems.
The proposed model is estimated using data from two time periods: (1) the
2000 U.S. Presidential election and (2) the 1896 US Presidential Election. The
2000 general election was contested between George Bush (the winner) and Al
Gore. In the Democratic primary, Al Gores main competitor was Bill Bradley.
In the Republican primary, George Bushs main competitor was John McCain.
The endogeneity problem in voter ideology is addressed using vote share of the
Republican and the Democratic parties in the 1896 election as an instrument
for the ideology of voters in the 2000 election. Miller and Schoeld (2003)
use state level data to demonstrate that the vote share of the 2000 Presidential
election is highly correlated with the vote share of the 1896 Presidential election.
The intuition lies in time invariant, location specic, preferences captured in the
results of the 1896 election. These preferences are correlated with voter ideology
in 2000, but are independent of candidatesunobserved qualities in 2000 as these
candidates did not exist in 1896. The two requirements for a valid instrumental
variable are satised.
The set of instruments used to address candidate policy position endogene-
ity are drawn from the industrial organization literature. In this literature, a
products price in market j is instrumented by using rivalsprices from markets
outside of market j. These prices do not a¤ect consumer demand in market
j, but are correlated with the underlying cost structure for the products in
this market. Therefore, these prices are also correlated with the rms price in
market j. In the election market, we consider a primary rivals ideology from
the opposing party as an instrument for the presidential candidatesperceived
ideology. For example, the ideological position of Bradley is used to instru-
ment for Bush and the ideological position of McCain is used to instrument for
Gore. Bush must choose an ideological position, which secures him victory in
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the Republican primary and remains competitive in the General Election. It is
plausible for Bush to take a policy position conditional on both Gores position
and McCains position. Bradleys policy position does a¤ect Gores policy posi-
tion in the Primary and indirectly a¤ects Bushs policy position through Gore.
Therefore, Bradleys position is correlated with Bush, but Bush and Bradley
never face each other in an election. Therefore, Bradleys policy position does
not a¤ect the vote within an election contested by Bush. The same holds true
for McCain and Gore.
The use of these instruments addresses one potential source of endogeneity
in a candidates policy position. A second source to consider is microtarget-
ing within a market. Both Gore and Bradley may take more liberal positions in
counties that are traditionally more democratic, but appear more conservative in
counties that are traditionally conservative (or Republican). Di¤erences in voter
ideology by county provides an incentive for candidates to deviate from their
national message.4 We address this issue by constructing the proposed instru-
ment using only votersperceptions from outside of the county. The perceived
policy position of candidate j by voters not residing in county k is correlated
with the perceived policy position of voters in county k, but uncorrelated with
"microtargeting" e¤orts within county k.
Our ndings are as follows. First, as our previous discussion suggests, once
the endogeneity in the ideology of voters is removed, ideological distance be-
comes less relevant in explaining vote choice than suggested by naive models.
Second, unlike pre-existenting game-theoretic models of voting, when the endo-
geneity in the candidate ideology is removed, ideological distance becomes much
more relevant in explaining vote choice than suggested by naive models. The
4Callander (2005) o¤ers a formal model with heterogenous districts. Since in his model
candidates are not allowed to microtarget, in equilibrium they choose noncentrist, divergent,
policy platforms. Our work and his work are complementary, since we deal with di¤erent
e¤ects caused by the presence of heterogeneous districts.
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latter e¤ect is the dominating bias. Therefore, when one accounts for these en-
dogeneity problems ideological distance becomes more relevant. Further, these
estimates support the idea that candidates avoid microtargeting voters that
ex-ante are more likely to support them. Instead, they use their resources to
microtarget swing voters that ex-ante are less likely to support them.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
a simple game between two candidates whose problem is to optimally allocate
microtargeting resources. Section 3 discusses two endogeneity biases present in
the estimation of spatial voting models. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5
discusses the methodology. Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Voting with microtargeting
Consider the following two-stage game with two o¢ ce seeking candidates. In
period one, based on his quality and his rivals quality, each candidate chooses a
general announcement, i.e. a policy position that is automatically and costlessly
delivered to all voters. In period 2, the candidates have the opportunity to
microtarget any particular voter at a certain cost, subject to a budget constraint.
Microtargeting may be either (i) a tailored message that moves the candidate
closer to the voter on ideological grounds or (ii) propaganda that enhances the
voters perception of the quality of the candidate.
Such game seems to be a reasonable description of actual electoral contests.
The two-stage game is solved backwards. For every possible prole of general
announcements, there is a subgame that begins in period 2. The solution to
the last-stage of the game sheds light on how candidates allocate resources to
microtarget voters, conditional on a particular prole of general announcements.
We focus on the second stage of the game where candidates make optimal choices
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on microtargeting.5
Consider two candidates who seek to win o¢ ce, L and R, and ve groups of
voters. The utility received by voter group i from candidate j is given by
uij = aij + bij + ej : (1)
The deterministic component aij represents the exogenous utility that voter
i gets from candidate j. This component aggregates all dimensions relevant
to the vote, including ideology and perceived quality of the candidate, bij is
another deterministic component of utility, but, unlike the exogenous aij , bij
is chosen by candidate j. It represents the utility that candidate j gives voter
i based on spending resources in microtargeting, either to make voter specic
announcements or to enhance voter is perception of candidate js quality.6
Each candidate j has a budget constraint, Bj , which represents the amount
of resources available to spend in microtargeting the voters. The stochastic
component ej represents a quality shock that takes place after the candidates
decided bij for every j; but before the election takes place. Hence, candidate
j chooses bij for every i without observing "L and "R, although he knows the
distribution from which they are drawn.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, candidates and voters observe
aij for every i and j: Second, after observing aij for every i and every j; each
candidate j chooses bij for every i subject to his budget constraint
IX
i=1
bij  Bj :
5Of course, the solution to our model could be in turn used to nd the optimal general
announcements. We would just have to nd the prole of general announcements that is a
sub-game perfect equilibirum. However, we do not need to solve the larger game to answer
our question.
6Microtargeting can be perceived as goodwill advertising for the candidate.
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Candidateschoices of bij are made simultaneously and non-cooperatively. Third,
voters (and candidates) observe the realization of the random shocks eL and eR,
common across voters. Finally, each voter votes for the candidate that gives him
the highest utility according to equation 1, and the candidate with the most
votes wins the election.
The probability that voter i votes for candidate L is
iL(biL; biR) = Pr[uiL > uiR]:
so that
iL(biL; biR) = Pr["L   "R > aiR + biR   (aiL + biL)] (2)
and iR(biL; biR) = 1  iL(biL; biR): The probability of victory of candidate j,
j(bL; bR), is the probability of obtaining more than 50% of the vote.
In the model, group 1 and group 5 are partisan (non-swing) voters. These
groups are modelled by setting a1L and a5R high enough so that for any value in
the support of "L  "R, u1L > u1R and u5L < u5R for any bL  (b1L; : : : ; b5L) 2
BL and bR  (b1R; : : : ; b5R) 2 BR. In other words, group 1 always prefers can-
didate L and group 5 always prefers candidate R. We order voters decreasingly
in terms of their relative utility aiL   aiR for candidate L: Hence,
a1L   a1R  a2L   a2R  : : :  a5L   a5R:
describes the relative ranking of utility among voters. We dene the observable
component of utility as uoij  aij + bij and the di¤erence in observable utility
in favor of candidate j as
ju
o
ij  (aij + bij)  (aik + bik)
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for k 6= j: Note, forjuoij > 0 voter i ex-ante supports candidate j; forjuoij = 0
voter i is indi¤erent between the two candidates and otherwise supports can-
didate k. The support of the exogenous shock "L   "R is assumed to include
values such that voters 2; 3 and 4 have a chance of supporting both candidates.
The following proposition states the Nash equilibrium in the game where
candidates L and R maximize their probability of victory. Let bj = (b1j ; : : : b5j)
be the vector of summarizing candidate js microtargeting e¤orts over the ve
voter groups:
Proposition The unique Nash equilibrium of the game is bL; b

R such that
bL = argmax
bL
fminfLuo2;Luo3gg,
bR = argmax
bR
fminfRuo3;Ruo4gg.
Proof. In Appendix.
The equilibrium vector of strategies in the proposition resembles the argu-
ment that maximizes a Rawlsian social welfare function (RSWF). A RSWF is
maximized when the utility of the individual with lowest utility is maximized.
In the proposition above, each candidate maximizes his probability of victory
when he maximizes the utility of the voter with the lowest relative utility among
all the voters in his minimum winning coalition. Interestingly, the "egalitarian
solution" in the proposition results from the behavior of self-interested agents
(candidates maximizing their expected probability of victory) rather than the
imposition of a positive postulate (as occurs with the RSWF).
The following corollary o¤ers further insight on the equilibrium strategies of
the candidates.
Corollary In equilibrium,
i) b1L = b

4L = b

5L = 0 and b

5R = b

2R = b

1R = 0.
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ii) b2L  b3L and b4R  b3R
iii) u1L   u1R  : : :  u5L   u5R
Proof. Derives immediately from the proposition and its proof.
Corollary i states the following: Voters 1 and 5 are partisan such that spend-
ing resources on them would be wasteful. Therefore, spending money in building
a coalition that is not minimal (more than three voters) would be wasteful. Can-
didate L needs the support of voters 2 and 3 in addition to voter 1 to meet the
minimum coalition size that secures victory; Candidate R needs the support of
voters 3; 4; and 5 to meet the minimum coalition size. In equilibrium, all the
candidatesresources must be allocated to appeal these voters.
Corollary ii says that among the voters that belong to their minimum win-
ning coalition, each candidate spends more money in those that have the lowest
ex-ante relative utility. Hence, in equilibrium uoij and bij must be negatively
correlated. In other words, candidate L spends more resources in voter 3 than
in voter 2, and candidate R spends more resources in voter 3 than in voter 4.
Note, this is not due to the fact that voter 3 has greater decision power relative
to voters 2 and 4, but to the fact that voter 3 is more likely to swing after the
random shock eL   eR occurs. Among all voters, 3 is ex-ante most indi¤erent
between both candidates. The implication that uoij and bij must be negatively
correlated is the focus of our empirical research. The remaining sections of this
paper are devoted to testing this implication.
Corollary iii states that, as a result of the equilibrium strategies, voters
with higher aiL   aiR end up with at least the same relative utility uiL   uiR
than voters with lower aiL aiR. There is no di¤erence in payo¤ between being
supported by only one and only two voters. Hence, the candidates tend to equate
the utilities from the two swing voters closest to them. They do this to avoid
the risk of ending up with only the partisan vote. Note, if the budget is large
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enough, each candidate allocates money such that his two recipients get exactly
the same relative utility. In this case, the result will be u2L   u2R = u3L   u3R
and u3R   u3L = u4R   u4L, and so juiL   uiRj = k  0 for every i:7
Broadly speaking, the proposition and its corollaries suggest that candidates
use their available resources to increase the scope of their support rather than
the strength of the support from each voter. This nding has anecdotal sup-
port. The following quotation from Ken Strasma, head of targeting e¤orts for
Barack Obamas 2008 campaign, demonstrates that microtargeting was indeed
the strategy used in Gores 2000 campaign:
"Microtargeting has evolved from an interesting buzzword to a
must-have technology for any serious campaign. Campaigns are all
about getting messages out to the people who are most likely to
be on the fence. We ask 10,000 voters their opinions on the race
and key issues and combine the results with marketing data about
them. We can predict how other people with similar demographic
proles would have answered those same questions, and we start
to see trends. Gin drinkers may be more likely to be Democrats.
Driving an SUV may make someone more likely to be Republican
or more sensitive to changes in gas prices. Those correlations tell
us what kinds of messages voters may be receptive to. In 2000, we
found that one of the worst groups in Florida for Gore was young
white men, but also that they could be moved by a message about
protecting the Everglades." (Svodoba, 2008)
7Same will happen if the voters consider that the candidates are close (enough) substitutes.
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3 Two endogeneity biases
Consider a model with I voters and 2 o¢ ce-motivated candidates. Let i and j
index voters and candidates, respectively. Each voter has a preferred ideologi-
cal position, xi; within the traditional liberal-conservative space.8 Candidates
announce their ideological positions simultaneously. We allow voters to have
di¤erent perceptions of a candidates ideological position. We use zij to denote
voter i0s perception of the policy position announced by candidate j. The utility
that voter i receives from voting for candidate j in election n is given by
uijn(xi; zij) =   jjxi   zij jj+ ij + ij + "ijn (3)
where j is a kx1-vector that represents the inuence of various sociodemo-
graphic variables in the choice for party j; i is a 1xk-vector describing sociode-
mographic characteristics of voter i, the operator jjjj is the Euclidean norm,
and the parameter  > 0 captures voters sensitivity to distance between a
candidates policy position and their own. The term ij represents all the char-
acteristics of candidate j not captured by policy position, as perceived by voter
i. We think of ij as voter is perception of candidate j0s quality. Finally, the
model is stochastic because it includes an idiosyncratic taste shock, "ijn, which
represents a shock to voter utility for candidate j. Although "ijn is unobserved,
the candidates are assumed to know the distribution from which this value is
drawn. Hence, the quality of candidate j is the sum of a deterministic and a
stochastic component, ij + "ijn.
8Although the theoretical model allows for any number of dimensions, our data restricts
us to a one dimensional space.
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3.1 Endogenous ideology of the candidates
Consider the benchmark model in which the perceptions of the policy announce-
ments from each candidate are identical across voters, that is, zij = zj for every
i 2 I: Each candidate maximizes his probability of victory subject to the para-
meters of the model (his quality, his rivalsqualities, the distribution of voter
ideology, and voter sociodemographic characteristics) and the policy positions
chosen by his rivals. An equilibrium of the game, denoted by z1 ; : : : ; z

J , is a
strategy prole such that, given rivalsstrategies, each candidate maximizes his
expected probability of victory.
Whenever the candidates have identical qualities, j =  for all j; the equilib-
rium is given by the well-known "median-voter theorem" where both candidates
announce the policy position preferred by the median voter.9 Instead, consider
a scenario where, without loss of generalization, candidate 1 has a quality ad-
vantage over candidate 2 (1 > 2). Aragones and Palfrey (2004, 2002) use a
deterministic model ("ijn.is set to zero for all i, j and n) to demonstrate that no
pure strategy equilibrium exists. In mixed strategies, candidate 1 announces a
policy close to the electoral center and candidate 2 moves to the periphery of the
electoral space. We refer to this outcome as the homogenous quality divergence
hypothesis, which says, when quality perceptions are homogenous across voters,
the higher quality candidate is more likely to locate close to the electoral center
than the lower quality candidate. Intuitively, if the low quality candidate moves
close to the electoral center, the two candidates become close substitutes along
ideological grounds and voters then base their decision on quality, leaving the
low quality candidate with no support at all.
Even when j is unobserved, the parameters  and j can be estimated
9Strictly speaking, the median voter theorem only holds for the "deterministic model" in
which "ij = 0. However, a similar result, known as the mean voter theorem obtains when the
latter condition is not satisied. See among others Lin et al. (1999), McKelvey and Patty
(2006), Banks and Duggan (2005) and Schoeld (2007).
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using limited dependent models like conditional multinomial logit and probit.
However, if the homogenous quality divergence hypothesis holds, then, in equi-
librium, the announcement of a high-quality candidate is more centrist, and
hence closer to the bulk of voters than the announcement of a lower quality ri-
val. Failure to account for the unobserved error component of utility, j , causes
an omitted variable bias in the estimate of  towards positive innite.
In contrast, consider a scenario where candidates can microtarget their mes-
sages at a certain cost. A plausible way to model microtargeting is to allow
the position of candidate j as perceived by voter i to depend on candidate js
investment on individualizing his message for voter i: Hence, in this setting, the
utility can be re-written as
uij(xi; zij) =   jjxi   zij (mij)jj+ ij + ij + "ijn (4)
where zij () is voters i perception of candidates j policy position. A candi-
dates perceived policy position is a function of the money spent by candidate
j on microtargeting voter i, mij . Since microtargeting is costly, candidates op-
timally spend their resources in voters with a high return rate. Candidate j
invests more resources to microtarget his policy announcement to those swing
voters that are less likely to vote for him based on non-ideological factors. A
swing voter who is unlikely to vote for candidate j based on the candidates
perceived quality may be a better investment than a voter who already believes
the candidate to be of high quality. A tailored message may su¢ ce to make
the rst voter support the candidate. The marginal benet of investing more
resources into the second voter, who is likely to support the candidate, may
be small. This leads to the heterogenous quality divergence hypothesis, which
says if quality perceptions are heterogenous across voters, then as a candidates
quality increases, as perceived by the voter, the expected ideological distance
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between them increases. The candidate is less inclined to spend resources to
microtarget a voter who already perceives him to be of high quality. Note, the
heterogenous quality divergence hypothesis is in full agreement with the equi-
librium found above in the proposition. The portions of utility ij + ij and
  jjxi   zij (mij)jj are the analog to aij and bij in equation 1, respectively.
Under this specication, candidate j spends money mij on voter i with the aim
to move the voters perceived policy position of the candidate closer to the voter
is most-preferred policy.10
The homogenous quality divergence hypothesis and the heterogenous qual-
ity divergence hypothesis yield almost opposite predictions. The homogenous
quality divergence hypothesis predicts that a high quality candidate is likely
to be ideologically close to (the bulk of) the voters. The heterogenous quality
divergence hypothesis predicts that a candidate is likely to be ideologically far
from those voters that consider him to be a high quality candidate. If the het-
erogenous quality divergence hypothesis holds, then a naive estimation where
ij is omitted biases  towards negative innite because quality perceptions and
probability of vote are positively correlated. Eventually, a naive estimation may
yield a negative value of , as if ideological distance were to increase the utility
level. An instrumental variable for zij can solve this endogeneity problem.
We propose using the policy position associated with candidate j0s rival in
the primary as an instrument for candidate js rival in the general election.
In the industrial organization literature, rms make pricing and production
decisions strategically, i.e., conditional on the pricing and production decisions
10An alternative specication of equation 4 is
uij(xi; zj) =   jjxi   zij jj+ij+ij (mij)+"ij :
Under this alternative specication of uij(xi; zj);   jjxi   zij jj+ij and ij (mij) would
be the analog to aij and bij in equation 1, respectively. Here, candidate j spends money mij
with the aim to enhance voter is perceived quality of candidate j. Both specications lead to
the same conclusions. Our empirical strategy does not allow us to support one specication
or the other. Schoeld (2006) studies a model with similar characteristics. However, in his
model the perception of quality is identical across voters.
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of their rivals. We extend this approach to elections, in full agreement with the
theoretical model of politics. Consider a primary election. Candidates choose
positions on policy issues conditional on their rivals positions. The winning
candidate takes his position into the general election, or a policy position highly
correlated with this original position. Therefore, a primary rivals policy position
is correlated with a candidates policy position in the general election, but is
uncorrelated with the voters decision in the general election. Since, the rival
candidate is no longer in the voters choice set during the general election, he
or she cannot a¤ect the vote outcome.
Although the proposed instrument should correct for endogeneity associated
with the homogenous quality divergence hypothesis, the instrument may still be
correlated with microtargeting. There still exists the possibility that, say, Gore
and Bradleys received messages are correlated with Bushs received message.
This strategy may occur if candidates tailor their messages at the state or county
level. For example, not only Gore and Bradley, but Bush as well, may attempt
to move their platforms to the left when they address their messages to voters
in Massachusetts. Therefore, the instrument is constructed using rivalspolicy
positions as perceived by voters not in the same election market as voter i (i.e.,
di¤erent states or counties). The modied instrument is independent of candi-
date js unobserved quality as perceived by voter i because voter i0s ideology
does not a¤ect the instrument. Further, the modied instrument is indepen-
dent of local ideological preference, which change as a result of the candidates
tailoring their messages to specic audiences.
3.2 Endogenous ideology of the voters
Implicit in the previous model is the assumption that voters preferences are
independent of a candidates policy position. This assumption underestimates
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the role of deliberation and public discussion in a democracy. In pre-electoral
debates, voterspolicy preferences are yet to be "formed", among other reasons
because new information will ow. The candidatesannouncements are usually
followed by explanations, arguments, and discussion to persuade the voters. It
is plausible to think that high quality candidates are more e¤ective in convinc-
ing voters that their policy positions are better than their lower quality rivals.
We refer to this phenomena as the deliberation hypothesis. The utility function
accounts for this hypothesis by allowing voter ideology, xi(), to be a function
of candidatesqualities.
uij(xi; zij) =   jjxi (i1; : : : ; iJ)  zij (mij)jj+ ij + ij + "ijn (5)
The deliberation hypothesis implies that, in a naive estimation where ij is
omitted, the estimate of  is biased. That is, if (i) the true model is given by
equation 5, where ij enters in the utility function of the voter, and (ii) ij is
correlated with candidate js ability to convince the voter that his position is
"the right position", then the omission of variable ij is likely to generate an
inconsistent estimation of the coe¢ cient : If the deliberation hypothesis holds,
in a naive estimation  may be biased towards positive innite. The importance
of ideological distance in the vote choice is overestimated. This bias occurs be-
cause candidate quality increases the probability of vote and, by the deliberation
hypothesis, it decreases the ideological distance. In order to obtain a consistent
estimation of  in the presence of omitted variables, an instrumental variable
(IV) can be used. A valid IV must be highly correlated with the ideological dis-
tance between the voter and the candidates, but uncorrelated with the quality
of the candidates.
We propose using the vote share of the Republican and Democratic parties in
the 1896 election as an IV for the position of the candidates in the 2000 election.
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Miller and Schoeld (2003) provides evidence that the 2000 Presidential election
in the United States is highly correlated with the 1896 election. The authors
nd using state level data that voter share in 1896 predicts the vote share in
2000 very well.11 The observed correlation is interesting for two reasons: (1)
these elections are distant by more than 100 years; (2) the correlation has a
striking pattern, since the vote share of the Democratic party predicts very well
the vote share of the Republican party, and the vote share of the Republican
party predicts very well the vote share of the Democratic party. In other words,
there is a nearly perfect reversal of the partisan alignment between 1896 and
2000. The correlation in voting patterns between these two elections is based on
geographical factors that a¤ect the preferences. Although one may think that
the quality of a party may be correlated with its short-term and perhaps even
medium-term vote share, it is very unlikely that such e¤ect can persist for over
100 years.12
4 Data
The paper utilizes data from two sources to estimate the theoretical model. The
rst dataset is obtained from the Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press (PEW). In January 2000, the PEW administered a survey of potential
voters collecting demographic information, ideological preferences of the voter
as well as candidates, and perceived voting choices in both primaries and in
the general election. The three questions of interest are pertaining to the po-
tential voters choices in both the Republican and Democratic primaries as well
as the General Election, which is contested by Gore, Bush, and Buchanan. In
the Democratic primary, the election is between Gore and Bradley. In the Re-
11A simple regression of percentage of Democratic vote in 2000 on percentage Democratic
vote in 1896 gives a strongly signicant negative coe¢ cient, and an R2 = 0:37.
12See Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) for the use of a lagged variable as an IV.
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publican primary, the election is between Bush and McCain. Voter information
about these primaries is our rst source of instruments. A candidate who is
seeking the o¢ ce of president must rst prevail in his partys primary. There-
fore, his ideological position will depend on his primary rival and, potentially,
on his rivals ideology in the general election. In the case of Bush, his policy
position is a¤ected by both the policy positions of McCain and Gore. On the
other hand, Gores policy position is a¤ected by both the policy positions of
Bush and Bradley. In both instances, the candidate who fails to get the partys
nomination is a viable instrument for the policy position of the opposing partys
nominee. These potential instruments are justied via an exclusion restriction.
These candidates are never in the same choice set for a particular voter (Bush
does not face Bradley and McCain does not face Gore), but their ideological
positions are correlated through their mutual rival (Bush and Bradley are both
rivals to Gore).13 Truly, Bushs position may incorporate Bradleys position
and quality if Bush is forward looking, but in January 2000 there is su¢ cient
empirical evidence to suggest Gore was the likely winner of the Democratic
primary. According to the January 2000 ABC News/Washington Post Poll,
65.8% of voters believe Bush would win the Republican Primary (McCain re-
ceiving 18.3%) and Gore received 66.8% of voter support relative to 26.4% for
Bradley in the Democratic Primary.14
The second data set contains vote share by FIPS code for the 1896 Pres-
idential election. Miller and Schoeld (2003) estimate a simple regression of
percentage of Democratic vote in 2000 on percentage Democratic vote in 1896
and obtain a strongly signicant negative coe¢ cient and an R2 = 0:37. Clearly,
neither the candidates nor the voters of the 2000 election were alive in 1896.
13The proposed instruments for candidate ideology are as follows: Bush is instrumented by
Bradley, Gore is instrumented by McCain, McCain is instrumented by both Gore and Bradley,
Bradley is instrumented by both Bush and McCain.
14The vote shares for each primary in the Pew sample state 78% of voters support Gore in
the Democratic Primary and 74% of voters support Bush in the Republican primary.
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The strong correlation is driven by time invariant preferences that are location
specic.15
Variables obtained from these two sources are summarized in Table 1. A total
of 540 voters are available in the PEW survey. The paper focuses on voters of
the two major parties, which drops the total number of observations to 518.
In observable characteristics, there are several di¤erences in the average voter
prole between candidates, which are statistically signicant at the 5% level.
Voters who support Bush are more likely to be married, white, and homeowners.
Further, Bush supporters view Gore as being more liberal than Gore supporters
do. On the other hand, Gore supporters have ideologies that are more liberal
than Bush supporters and are more likely to live in a city. In this survey, 314
individuals state they will vote for Bush, which leads to a vote share of 58%.1617
5 Methodology
5.1 Empirical Model
We index elections using n. Each voter is observed to vote in three elections:
Democratic primary (n = 1), Republican primary (n = 2), and General Election
(n = 3). Each election consists of a choice between only two candidates. All
candidates are involved in one primary, but only the winners of the primaries
(Gore and Bush) move to the general election. The index j denotes the can-
didates. To save notation, the values that j takes are election specic, i.e. the
15For example, states who are heavily dependent on agricultural products like tobacco and
cotton have not changed over time. The welfare of citizens within these states is dependent
on these cash crops, thus, policies a¤ecting these crops will inuence voting behavior in these
states.
16The actual vote share in the 2000 election is 47.8% for Bush and 48.4% for Gore. George
Bush wins the electoral college.
17These means in vote share are consistent with those found using the January 2000 ABC
News/Washington Post Poll where 57% of the vote share is given to George Bush when
excluding Buchanan.
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same individual competing in two di¤erent elections is assigned di¤erent values.
These values are given in the following chart.
n j Candidate
1 1 Gore (vs. Bradley)
1 2 Bradley (vs. Gore)
2 3 Bush (vs. McCain)
2 4 McCain (vs. Bush)
3 5 Gore (vs. Bush)
3 6 Bush (vs. Gore)
For example, j = 1 denotes Gore in the primary versus Bradley, and j = 5
denotes Gore in the general election versus Bush.
The empirical model follows directly from the theoretical model. A voters
utility function is assumed to take the form
uijn(xi; zij) =   jxi   zij j+ ij + ij + "ijn (6)
where xi is the voters ideological position, zij is candidate js policy position as
perceived by voter i, and i is a vector of voter specic traits including: sex, age,
education, race, marital status, religion, income, employment, home ownership,
union status, and location.18 The taste preferences for each candidate, j , and
the quality, ij , are assumed to be identical across elections (implying that
1 = 5; 3 = 6, i1 = i5, and i3 = i6). A voters sensitivity to ideological
distance is captured by the parameter, ; and is assumed to be the same across
all candidates.
There are two unobservable shocks. The candidates quality shock, ij ;
18The squared deviation in ideological space is also considered. These results are found in
the appendix.
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is modelled as a random e¤ect where ij  N
 
j ; 
2
j

. The quality shock is
observed by the voter, but unobserved by the econometrician. The unobserved
quality shock is potentially correlated with both the candidates policy posi-
tion and the voters ideology. The last term, "ijn; is assumed to be distributed
i.i.d. Type I Extreme Value with mean zero and variance ()
2
6 :
19 The indices
i; j; and n represent voters, candidates, and election, respectively. The un-
known parameters  =
 
; j ; j ; 
2
j

are estimated using simulated maximum
likelihood.
In the empirical model, each voter draws a quality measure for each candi-
date from the distribution ij  N
 
j ; 
2
j

. Conditional on all candidatesun-
observed qualities, the voter then chooses candidate j when uijn(xi; zij jij ; i) >
uikn(xi; zikjik; i) 8 k 6= j: Given the distributional assumption of "ijn; the
probability of selecting candidate j in election n is given by the mixed logit
probability [Mcfadden 1973].
Pr(jj; ij) = exp [  jxi   zij j+ ji + ij)= ]P
k
exp [  jxi   zikj+ ji + ik)= ]
(7)
Instead of a simple binary choice, the voters likelihood contribution must
capture the voters joint decision across the three elections. A voters likelihood
contribution conditional on the unobserved quality shock for all candidates is
the product of probabilities given by equation (7) over all elections
L(yij; ij) =
6Y
j=1
Pr(jj; ij)yijn
where yijn takes the value of 1 if voter i chooses candidate j in election n and 0
otherwise, and yi is a vector summarizing the vote decision in each election for
each candidate.
19The variance parameter  is normalized to unity in estimation.
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5.2 Identication
There exist several challenges in identifying all the parameters of the model.
First, the discrete choice framework only allows for the identication of relative
di¤erences in utility. For this reason, the utility received from voting for Bradley
is normalized to ui;Bradley =   jxi   zi;Bradleyj. Note, with the exception of ,
all the taste parameters and the unobserved quality shock, ij , are set to zero.
The scaling parameter of the idiosyncratic error, "ijn; is set to  = 1:
Second, the random e¤ect capturing a candidates quality would typically
be identied using panel data over time for the same voter. Jointly estimating a
voters choices over the three elections behaves similarly to observing the same
voter over three time periods. The parameters associated with the random ef-
fects are identied via variation in vote choice among observationally equivalent
voters.20
Lastly, the parameter associated with sensitivity to ideological di¤erences,
; is potentially biased. We allow for endogeneity in both voter ideology and
candidates policy position as being correlated with the unobserved candidate
quality. Our method to control for endogeneity follows the limited information
maximum likelihood approach introduced in Villas-Boas and Winer (1999) and
Newey (1985, 1987). We use the following linear equation to estimate the relative
distance in ideology between candidates and voters
jxi   zij j = 0 + 1i + 2Wij + eij (8)
where W is an appropriate set of instruments that are uncorrelated with the
regression error, eij :21 The error term is assumed to be distributed normal with
20McCains estimates are found with less precision than those for Gore and Bush because
McCain participates in only one election. Although the same is true for Bradley, recall that
his parameters have been normalized to zero.
21Because we normalize parameters with respect to Bradley, Gore and Bradley are instru-
mented jointly as jxi   zij j  
xi   zi;Bradley = 0 + 1i + 2Wij + eij
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mean zero and nite variance, 2id;j :
22 If both candidates policy position and
voter ideology are independent of candidate quality, then E [eijij ] = 2j
2
id;j =
0, else at least one variable is endogenous. Therefore, an endogeneity bias is
present if  6= 0:23
The instruments, W = [Wv;Wc], are separated into two groups. Voter spe-
cic instruments, Wc; include the vote share for William J. Bryan in the 1896
Presidential election by FIPS code and mean voter ideology excluding voters
from the voter i0s FIPS code. Candidate specic instruments, Wv; include
ideology of rival candidates in the opposing party as perceived by voters not in
voter is FIPS (e.g. McCains ideology instruments for Gores ideology). The
vote share from the 1896 election serves as a proxy for time invariant location
specic preferences that are una¤ected by a candidates quality. The second
instrument can be seen as a parallel to using rivals rms production as an in-
strument in the industrial organization literature.24 No one candidate should
take too much of an extremist position in the primary as that stance does not
bode well in the general election. Therefore, a rivals policy position captures
a sense of cost from deviating too much from the electoral center. When con-
structing this variable we take particular care in minimizing the e¤ects of micro-
targeting. Often, it is observed that local media outlets and TV stations provide
advertisements from national candidates who choose a few issues targeted to the
region. Only the perceptions of voters outside of voter is FIPS code are used
to construct the instrument, thus minimizing the e¤ect of targeting.25
22 Ideological distance between candidates and voters is always a non-negative number.
Given the assumption of a normally distributed error it is possible to have negative pre-
dicted values for Ideological distance. We provide estimates in Table 8 where the di¤erence
in log distance is used instead. The results remain robust to this specication.
23An alternative IV approach is to estimate separate IV models for candidate position, zij ,
and voter ideology, xi, then nd the predicted residual as beij = jxi  zij j   jbxi  bzij j; but this
methods is less e¢ cient because it does not use both set of instruments jointly.
24The proposed static model assumes candidates are not forward looking. If candidates are
forward looking, then the validity of the candidate specic instruments is weakend because
each candidate would then select an ideological position conditional on all rivalsqualities and
positions.
25Table A1 contains a set of regression estimates capturing the correlation between the
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5.3 Estimation
Since there is no closed form solution for the integration of the conditional
likelihood function, the parameters of the model are estimated using simulated
maximum likelihood (SML). The unconditional likelihood contribution of voter
i is
Li
 
; ; 2id;;j

= f
 
eij j; 2id;;j
 Z
L(yij; ij)f
 
ij jj ; ; eij ; 2;j

dij
where f () is the normal density function and the conditional likelihood func-
tion, L(yij; ij), is evaluated with respect to the three-dimensional integral
over the distribution of unobserved candidate-quality shocks. Note, the distri-
bution from which quality shocks are drawn depends on the realization of the
error from the instrumental variables equation, eij : It is through this mechanism
that the endogeneity in  is removed and allows for the consistent estimation
of the parameters in the unobserved candidate-quality distribution. Simula-
tion methods are used to approximate the value of the likelihood function by
randomly taking R draws from the distribution f
 
ij jj ; ; eij ; 2;j

:26 These
draws are denoted by rij :
27 The likelihood function is then approximated by
the following function
eLi  ; ; 2id;;j = f  eij j; 2id;;j 1RXL(yij; rij)
and the parameters that maximize this function are called the SML estimates.
proposed instruments and the endogenous variables.
26See Stern (1994) for further discussion on simulation methods.
27We use 200 draws of the random shock for each candidate in estimation.
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6 Results
The standard logit estimates, which do not control for endogeneity or unob-
served heterogeneity, are found in Table 2. These baseline estimates are used
to compare the outcomes from models that include instruments and unobserved
heterogeneity. Note, the taste coe¢ cients associated with Bradley have been
normalized to zero. Hence, the interpretation of the taste parameters are viewed
as being relative to Bradley. In the baseline model, voters are found to be sensi-
tive to ideological di¤erences. These results are consistent with previous studies
of voting behavior [see Alvarez and Nagler (1998), Schoeld and Sened (2006),
Quinn and Martin (2002)]. Other factors contributing to voting behavior in-
clude race, age, martial status, employment status, and urbanization. All of
these variables signicantly a¤ect the vote share for Gore at the 1%. Bushs
vote share is primarily a¤ected by home ownership status (increases vote share)
and union membership (decreases vote share).
The rst extension of the baseline model includes the use of unobserved can-
didate specic shocks. Table 3 provides the estimates of the baseline model
including candidate unobserved heterogeneity. The random e¤ects model pro-
vides standard deviation estimates, j , that are highly signicant. Hence, there
is an important amount of unobserved heterogeneity across voters regarding
their perceptions of the quality of the candidates. This result may be due to
heterogenous beliefs on the part of the population. On the other hand, if one
considers the unobserved shock to be a composite of candidate attributes such
as moral values and leadership abilities, then the heterogeneity may be driven
by voter di¤erences on the relative weight of these characteristics. Clearly,
the nding that unobserved heterogeneity is prevalent weakens the appeal of
the homogenous quality divergence hypothesis, since the latter builds on the as-
sumption that voters have identical perceptions of the quality of the candidates.
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Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity increases the estimate of voters
sensitivity to ideological di¤erences, ; from ( 0:4611) to ( 0:9210) or an in-
crease of 99.7%. The di¤erence in coe¢ cients between models is signicant at
the 1%.28 However, other signicant estimates also show an increase of similar
magnitude. (For example, the coe¢ cient associated to high school increase from
0.85 to 1.37, and the coe¢ cient associated to homeowner increases from 0.62 to
1.47). The variance of the error, "ijn; in the baseline model is always necessarily
greater than the variance of the error in the model with unobserved heterogene-
ity. This, coupled with the normalization of  = 1; makes the mean coe¢ cients
of the unobserved heterogeneity model larger than those of the baseline model.
The increased size of the coe¢ cients is suggestive evidence that the unobserved
error is not only composed of random shocks, but candidate specic shocks play
an important role.
A small share of the increase in  may not be due to re-scaling, but to an
omitted variable bias. If we observed an individual who is ideologically similar to
a candidate, but instead votes for the rival, then it must imply this voter received
a very low quality shock from the ideologically closer candidate. Alternatively,
if we observe a voter who is ideologically far from the candidate, but the voter
still chooses the candidate, then the voter received a very high quality shock. In
both instances, the naive estimation fails to account for the unobserved shocks in
quality and interprets these actions as low sensitivity to ideological di¤erences.
For all three candidates, we nd the unobserved variance to be statistically
di¤erent than zero. Gore is found to have the largest variance followed by Bush
and McCain. Since Gore served as Vice President for eight years, the variation
about his quality is likely to be associated to heterogenous judgements rather
than uncertainty on the part of the voters. A likelihood ratio test rejects the
null hypothesis of all the unobserved variances being equal to zero at the 1%
28The Student T statistic on the estimate di¤erence in  across models is 3.84.
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level.29
Second, the existence of signicant unobserved heterogeneity across voters
suggests that the heterogenous quality divergency hypothesis may play a role.
Indeed, comparing Table 3 and Table 4, we see that using instrumental vari-
ables to remove the endogeneity in the position of the candidates yields a much
larger in absolute value estimate of the importance in ideological di¤erences.
Specically,  increases from ( 0:9210) to ( 1:3576) or an increase of 47.4%.
The di¤erence in estimates is signicant at the 1% level.30 A simple comparison
of the coe¢ cients of Table 3 and Table 4 shows that the increase in beta is not
due to re-scaling. In fact, most of the signicant coe¢ cients are smaller in mag-
nitude in the IV model with unobserved heterogeneity than in the unobserved
heterogeneity only model.31
The estimated correlation coe¢ cients, id;j , which measure the level of en-
dogeneity between candidate quality and ideological distance, are all found to
be positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level. A likelihood test rejects
the null hypothesis that all the correlation coe¢ cients are equal to zero at the
1% level.32 Therefore, as the unobservable quality increases so does ideological
distance. These results provide further evidence in support of the heterogeneous
divergence hypothesis (and contradicts the homogenous divergence hypothesis).
Candidates can still obtain the vote from voters who are ideologically distant
when those voters perceive the candidate to be of high quality.
To this point we have implicitly adopted the accepted assumption that can-
didates are strictly o¢ ce-motivated. One can argue that candidates may also
have policy preferences. Under this assumption, the cost of moving away from
a candidates most-preferred position would be a potential confounder in the
29The likelihood ratio test gives a test statistic equal to 196.07.
30The test statistic is T=-3.647.
31For example, age decreases in magnitude from  0:04 to  0:03, homeowner from 1:47 to
1:35 and union from  2:00 to  1:54.
32The likelihood ratio test statistic equals 31.5416.
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policy positions of candidates. If candidates have exogenously determined
most-preferred positions, then moving away from these position to points that
maximize candidateselectoral performance may decrease candidatesutilities.
A candidate who has a lower cost of deviating from their ideal policy position
is capable of being more strategic as is the case with McCain. Therefore, a
possible reason we nd a heterogenous e¤ect across candidates is that each can-
didate has a di¤erent cost of deviating from their ideal points. Levitt (1996)
nds a similar result in the voting record of senators where the senators ideal
policy position is the driving factor behind their vote.
As a robustness check, we provide estimates for two alternative metrics of
ideological distance. The rst metric uses the squared di¤erence in ideology.
Initially, Hotelling (1929) nds an equilibrium in location choice based on linear
transportation cost of consumers. DAspremont et al. (1979) later show that
a unique equilibrium in rm location only exists using quadratic transportation
cost. The key di¤erence with these location models and optimal policy position
for a candidate is that a rm chooses price and location to maximize prots while
a candidate chooses only location (e¤ectively removing the issues associated with
the pricing stage). These results are found in Tables 5. These estimates are
consistent with the previous results assuming linear transportation. The sec-
ond metric focuses on the instrumental variables equation. Ideological distance
can only take non-negative values, but the disturbance term is assumed to be
distributed normal. In this case, the linear regression line may predict negative
values of the ideological distance and potentially bias the estimates of both id;j
and : The instrumental variables equation is modied by using the natural log-
arithm of ideological distance, log (jxi   zij j+ 1) ; allowing negative predicted
values to represent positive ideological distances. The natural logarithm of
ideological distance is also used in the voters utility function. The voters
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taste parameter for ideological distance, ; is interpreted as an elasticity within
this model. The models estimated coe¢ cients are found in Table 6. Again,
the correlation coe¢ cients, id;j ; are all found to be positive and statistically
signicant suggesting that ideological distance remains endogenous.
Next, we conduct the following exercise to identify the existence of both voter
endogeneity and candidate endogeneity. The instrumental variables model is
estimated twice under di¤erent assumptions. First, the model is estimated
only using candidate specic instruments to remove the endogeneity in ideologi-
cal distance. Then, the model is estimated using only voter specic instruments
for the measure of ideological distance. In each case, all the parameters in the
utility function are estimated. These estimates from this exercise are found in
Tables 7.33 When only candidate specic instruments are used the estimate
for  increases by more than the coe¢ cient found when using both types of in-
struments. In addition, the correlation coe¢ cients for each candidate increases
and remain statistically signicant at the 1%. The candidate only instruments
demonstrate how a naive estimation underestimates the ideology sensitivity pa-
rameter. This reinforces the hypothesis that candidates do strategically in-
teract based on their relative qualities when choosing policy positions. When
only voter specic instruments are used only one correlation coe¢ cient can be
identied because the instruments do not vary by candidate. Therefore, we
force all the candidates to have the same correlation coe¢ cient. The estimate
for  decreases by more than the coe¢ cient found when using both types of
instruments. The correlation coe¢ cient is negative in this setup. The esti-
mate suggests as a candidates perceived quality increases the relative distance
in ideology between voter and candidate decreases. The voter only instruments
demonstrate how a naive estimation overstates a voters sensitivity to ideologi-
cal di¤erences, which shows support for the deliberation hypothesis. This result
33Unobservable Heterogeneity is estimated in all models.
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suggests high quality candidates are better at persuading voters than their lower
quality rivals of what the ideal policy position is. Given these point estimates
we nd candidate endogeneity dominates voter endogeneity.
Unobserved
Heterogeneity Model IV both IV: candidate only IV: Voter only
  0:9210  1:3576  1:4772  0:5572
Lastly, we seek to provide further evidence of the heterogenous divergence
hypothesis by estimating the full model on a sub-sample of voters. The het-
erogenous divergence hypothesis should be more prevalent among swing voters.
The distribution of voters ideology and mean candidate ideology are illustrated
in Figure 1. Given this distribution of voter ideology, we consider the voters
located at 3 and 4 as swing voters because they are located between the po-
tential presidential candidates. If these voters are removed from the voting
population, then candidates have less of an incentive to microtarget and the
estimated correlation coe¢ cients become less important. The full model is es-
timated removing the swing voters (those with ideological positions at 3 and
4) from the sample. These estimates are found in Table 7. Although, all
the correlation coe¢ cients are found to be positive, which is in support of the
heterogeneous divergence hypothesis, none are statistically di¤erent from zero.
The absence of swing voters lessens the incentive to microtarget because voter
who are ideologically close to you are su¢ ciently far from your rival and remain
as strong supporters.
7 Conclusion
The outcome of a democratic election depends on the ideological stances of
the voters and the candidates. In the democratic game, candidates undertake
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the dual task of adopting optimal ideological stands and persuading voters that
their positions are better than their rivals. Our main conclusion is that both the
votersand the candidatesideological stances are the result of a complex game
whose primitives are the votersperceptions of candidatesqualities. Two e¤ects
are observed and measured. First, the candidates personalize their messages to
the voters. Since the personalization of the message is economically costly, the
candidates choose the optimal degree of personalization based on the voters
perception of the candidates quality. In particular, candidates do not waste
resources trying to persuade voters that are already likely to vote for them on
non-ideological grounds. They save those resources to deliver a personalized
message to those voters that are less likely to vote for them based on non-
ideological grounds.
The second e¤ect is that the ideological stances of the voters are highly
dependent on the position of the candidates, which in turn depend on their
qualities. High quality candidates are more likely to persuade voters that their
position is the ideal one relative to their lower-quality rivals. These two strate-
gies have opposing e¤ects on the estimated parameter capturing sensitivity to
ideological distance. Voter endogeneity is found to overstate the value of ide-
ological di¤erences to a voters utility. Candidates endogeneity is found to
underestimate the value of ideological di¤erence. The latter e¤ect dominates
the former causing a naive estimation to underestimate a voters sensitivity to
ideological di¤erences.
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8 APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition. Voter 1 supports L: Voter 4 supports L if voter
3 supports L: Voter 5 supports R: It follows that L(bL; bR) = Pr[2 votes L
\ 3 votes LjbL; bR]: Because " enters additively in both u2L   u2R and u3L  
u3R, L(bL; bR) = Pr[" > maxf Luo2L; Luo3Lg]: Equivalently, L(bL; bR) =
Pr[" >  minfLuo2L;Luo3Lg]:Hence, for bL = argmaxbLfminfLuo2;Luo3gg,
L(b

L; bR) > L(bL; bR) for any bL 6= bL; bR. Symmetric argument shows
that, for bR = argmaxbRfminfRuo3;Ruo4gg, R(bL; bR) > L(bL; bR) for any
bR 6= bR; bL. This proves bL; bR are strict dominant strategies. Hence, bL; bR is
the unique Nash equilibrium. QED
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Table1: Descriptive Statistics
Means by Vote
Variables Gore Bush Other Total
Bryan Vote Share 0:5156(0:1579)
0:5249
(0:1634)
0:5105
(0:1406)
0:5208
(0:1603)
Sex 0:4804(0:5008)
0:4427
(0:4975)
0:4091
(0:5032)
0:4556
(0:4985)
Gore Ideology 3:8137(1:3590)
4:2739
(1:5256)
3:4091
(1:4362)
4:0648
(1:4813)
Bush Ideology 2:8039(1:3828)
2:9045
(1:2903)
3:3636
(1:4325)
2:8852
(1:3338)
Bradley Ideology 3:7402(1:1936)
3:8121
(1:3255)
3:4091
(1:2968)
3:7685
(1:2763)
McCain Ideology 3:0882(1:2603)
2:9777
(1:1317)
3:0455
(1:2527)
3:0222
(1:1857)
Voter Ideology 3:7941(1:3742)
2:8631
(1:2952)
3:0455
(1:7037)
3:2222
(1:4138)
Age 45:74(16:50)
45:26
(17:30)
43:36
(19:57)
45:36
(17:07)
HS 0:2884(0:4530)
0:2277
(0:4193)
0:4348
(0:4957)
0:2593
(0:4382)
College 0:5070(0:4999)
0:5538
(0:4971)
0:5217
(0:4995)
0:5346
(0:4988)
MA 0:1488(0:3559)
0:1723
(0:3776)
0
(0)
0:1563
(0:3631)
Hispanic 0:0637(0:2449)
0:0541
(0:2267)
0
(0)
0:0556
(0:2293)
White 0:7255(0:4474)
0:9076
(0:2900)
0:7273
(0:4558)
0:8315
(0:3747)
Married 0:4755(0:5006)
0:6752
(0:4691)
0:4545
(0:5096)
0:5907
(0:4922)
Catholic 0:2402(0:4283)
0:2452
(0:4309)
0:1364
(0:3513)
0:2389
(0:4268)
Unemployed 0:3116(0:4632)
0:3169
(0:4653)
0:3043
(0:4601)
0:3144
(0:4643)
Income 37534(29010)
42852
(42958)
29348
(30007)
40293
(29903)
Homeowner 0:6373(0:4820)
0:7675
(0:4231)
0:6818
(0:4767)
0:7148
(0:4519)
Union 0:1814(0:3863)
0:1051
(0:3072)
0:1364
(0:3513)
0:1352
(0:3422)
City 0:2941(0:4568)
0:1624
(0:3694)
0:0909
(0:2942)
0:2093
(0:4072)
Suburb 0:2304(0:4221)
0:2930
(0:4559)
0:2273
(0:4289)
0:2667
(0:4426)
N 204 314 22 540
Note - standard deviation is found in parenthesis
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Table 2: Baseline Model
Variables Coef SE
Ideology -0.4611*** 0.0314
Bush Gore McCain
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Constant -0.2370 0.5357 0.2110 0.3827 -0.9829 0.6436
Sex 0.1796 0.2232 -0.0460 0.1531 -0.0830 0.2680
Age -0.0113 0.0074 0.0117** 0.0051 -0.0003 0.0088
High School 0.8551** 0.4022 0.8501*** 0.2865 0.0717 0.4852
College 0.3546 0.3844 0.1926 0.2733 0.1227 0.4609
Masters 0.3024 0.4584 0.1541 0.3222 0.2065 0.5498
Hispanic 0.3198 0.4654 -0.1887 0.3212 -0.6704 0.6002
White -0.3115 0.3296 -1.4471*** 0.2400 0.0023 0.3965
Married 0.2268 0.2593 -0.5087*** 0.1795 0.3442 0.3131
Catholic -0.3215 0.2643 -0.4928*** 0.1832 -0.3089 0.3189
100min -0.0018 0.4411 -0.4140 0.3018 -0.1017 0.5272
Income 0.0061 0.0047 0.0010 0.0032 0.0040 0.0057
Unemployed -0.0972 0.2697 -0.4403*** 0.1849 -0.2331 0.3223
Homeowner 0.6207** 0.2943 0.3515* 0.2057 0.4018 0.3559
Union -0.7050** 0.3232 0.2925 0.2220 -0.0831 0.3884
City 0.4666 0.2931 0.8251*** 0.2032 0.5291 0.3530
Suburb 0.2606 0.2571 0.6176*** 0.1754 0.4453 0.3089
ideology 1.2583*** 0.0261 1.4688*** 0.0305 1.1566*** 0.0240
LL 7430.75
Note - Bradleys parameters are normalized to zero; *** = 1% level ; ** = 5% level; *=10% level
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Table 3: Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity
Variables Coef SE
Ideology -0.9210*** 0.1155
Bush Gore McCain
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Constant -0.6243 1.0662 0.6419 0.7365 -3.0928** 1.3559
Sex 0.4286 0.4354 -0.1601 0.2940 -0.2460 0.4935
Age -0.0462*** 0.0161 0.0210** 0.0098 -0.0125 0.0168
High School 1.3728* 0.7984 1.4387*** 0.5618 -0.6348 0.9375
College 0.8335 0.7725 0.1504 0.5213 0.1542 0.8459
Masters 0.5891 0.9079 0.0466 0.6150 0.2606 1.0157
Hispanic 0.7540 0.8662 -0.1757 0.6126 -1.0802 1.0490
White 0.5390 0.6713 -2.7979*** 0.5274 1.4641* 0.8335
Married 1.2424** 0.5508 -1.0748*** 0.3600 1.4930*** 0.6224
Catholic -0.4538 0.5231 -1.1395*** 0.3723 -0.4540 0.5998
100min 0.2565 0.8850 -0.8180 0.5753 0.1841 0.9778
Income 0.0145 0.0093 0.0031 0.0061 0.0104 0.0105
Unemployed 0.4613 0.5311 -0.7563** 0.3499 0.1107 0.5930
Homeowner 1.4741*** 0.5822 0.8229** 0.4051 1.0468 0.6649
Union -2.0094*** 0.6696 0.5219 0.4342 -0.4586 0.7353
City 0.4138 0.5801 1.4521*** 0.4078 0.6754 0.6682
Suburb 0.3338 0.5086 1.2626*** 0.3700 0.9183 0.5931
ideology 1.2583*** 0.0261 1.4688*** 0.0305 1.1566*** 0.0240
Candidate 2.8872*** 0.4761 2.5748*** 0.3485 2.4115*** 0.8045
LL 7332.71
Note - Bradleys parameters are normalized to zero; *** = 1% level ; ** = 5% level; *=10% level
36
Table 4: IV Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity
Variables Coef SE
Ideology -1.3576*** 0.1817
Bush Gore McCain
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Constant -0.6050 0.9629 0.5238 0.7401 -1.8881* 1.0413
Sex 0.4517 0.3904 -0.1587 0.2897 -0.1425 0.4112
Age -0.0371*** 0.0139 0.0193** 0.0096 -0.0219 0.0142
High School 1.7239*** 0.7359 1.6755*** 0.5594 0.4853 0.7718
College 1.0656 0.7040 0.4510 0.5270 0.6868 0.7238
Masters 0.7425 0.8225 0.3245 0.6137 0.6359 0.8578
Hispanic 0.9761 0.7763 -0.2550 0.6078 -0.4401 0.8783
White -0.0276 0.5966 -2.5535*** 0.4976 0.7400 0.6570
Married 0.7297 0.4687 -1.0783*** 0.3488 1.0958** 0.4934
Catholic -0.5602 0.4697 -1.2050*** 0.3617 -0.5873 0.4973
100min 0.1086 0.7886 -0.9039 0.5678 -0.1609 0.8130
Income 0.0128 0.0083 0.0023 0.0060 0.0086 0.0087
Unemployed 0.2718 0.4797 -0.7100** 0.3442 -0.0054 0.5028
Homeowner 1.3556*** 0.5243 0.7703** 0.3917 1.0393* 0.5529
Union -1.5457*** 0.5799 0.4920 0.4249 -0.5506 0.6024
City 0.8758* 0.5314 1.3231*** 0.3956 0.7535 0.5549
Suburb 0.5215 0.4591 1.1668*** 0.3531 0.7922 0.4843
ideology 1.2583*** 0.0261 1.4688*** 0.0305 1.1566*** 0.0240
Candidate 2.3160*** 0.2811 2.5629*** 0.2893 1.3452*** 0.3301
ideology;Candidate 0.3710*** 0.1003 0.2144*** 0.0919 0.9717*** 0.1619
LL 7316.94
Note - Bradleys parameters are normalized to zero; *** = 1% level ; ** = 5% level; *=10% level
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Table 5: Quadratic Model
Variables Baseline Model Unobserved Hetrogeneity IV
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Ideology -0.0941*** 0.0078 -0.1636*** 0.0219 -0.2684*** 0.0438
Bush
ideology 5.5029*** 0.1142 5.4959*** 0.1139 5.5047*** 0.1143
Candidate 2.5656*** 0.4168 2.4042*** 0.2822
ideology;Candidate 0.3390*** 0.1032
Gore
ideology 6.2812*** 0.1304 6.2856*** 0.1305 6.2862*** 0.1306
Candidate 2.4470*** 0.2950 2.5559*** 0.2832
ideology;Candidate 0.1866* 0.1004
McCain
ideology 4.6489*** 0.0965 4.6502*** 0.0965 4.6469*** 0.0964
Candidate 0.9536 1.4109 1.0746*** 0.3112
ideology;Candidate 0.9132*** 0.1783
LL 12486.31 12378.70 12368.84
Note - Bradleys parameters are normalized to zero; *** = 1% level ; ** = 5% level; *=10% level
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Table 6: Log Distance - IV
Variables Coef SE
Ideology -3.2797*** 0.4424
Bush Gore McCain
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Constant -0.6050 0.9849 0.3531 0.7410 -2.0039* 1.1462
Sex 0.5362 0.4038 -0.2411 0.2943 -0.1589 0.4347
Age -0.0423*** 0.0148 0.0166* 0.0098 -0.0224 0.0149
High School 1.6346** 0.7503 1.9312*** 0.5818 0.1414 0.8218
College 0.9849 0.7178 0.6916 0.5386 0.4877 0.7513
Masters 0.6901 0.8414 0.5754 0.6263 0.5040 0.8960
Hispanic 0.8858 0.7996 -0.2304 0.6095 -0.7129 0.9271
White 0.0187 0.6215 -2.5614*** 0.5054 0.8052 0.7206
Married 0.6768 0.4925 -1.2336*** 0.3568 0.9937* 0.5267
Catholic -0.4748 0.4823 -1.2292*** 0.3707 -0.6563 0.5241
100min 0.2274 0.8111 -0.9281 0.5807 -0.1168 0.8516
Income 0.0149* 0.0086 0.0035 0.0061 0.0121 0.0092
Unemployed 0.4688 0.5008 -0.5901 0.3482 0.1724 0.5296
Homeowner 1.4486*** 0.5442 0.8392** 0.3988 1.1703 0.5870
Union -1.4626*** 0.6019 0.5430 0.4327 -0.5064 0.6346
City 0.7156 0.5431 1.2830*** 0.4016 0.6148 0.5835
Suburb 0.4224 0.4730 1.0875*** 0.3604 0.8398 0.5145
ideology 0.5334*** 0.0111 0.6312*** 0.0131 0.5072*** 0.0105
Candidate 2.6405*** 0.3120 2.3974*** 0.3376 1.8481*** 0.5715
ideology;Candidate 0.3322*** 0.1074 0.2354*** 0.0885 0.8017*** 0.2166
Note - Bradleys parameters are normalized to zero; *** = 1% level ; ** = 5% level; *=10% level
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Table 7: Di¤erent IV Specications
Candidate IV only1 Voter IV only2 No Swing Voters3
Variables Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Ideology -1.4772*** 0.1739 -0.5572*** 0.0219 -0.9894*** 0.2339
ideology;voter -0.2151*** 0.0444
Bush
ideology 1.2136*** 0.0252 1.2635*** 0.0263 1.2583*** 0.0261
Bush 2.3640*** 0.2765 2.3546*** 0.2888 2.2259*** 0.4854
ideology;Bush 0.4776*** 0.0842 0.1151 0.1636
Gore
ideology 1.4582*** 0.0303 1.9504*** 0.0403 1.4688*** 0.0305
Gore 2.6904*** 0.2993 2.4487*** 0.2795 2.1578*** 0.4204
ideology;Gore 0.2618*** 0.0787 0.0993 0.1445
McCain
ideology 1.1299*** 0.0234 1.1574*** 0.0240 1.1566*** 0.0240
McCain 1.4175*** 0.2521 1.4E-06 0.0008 1.0341 1.1368
ideology;McCain 0.9732*** 0.0829 0.5897 0.6836
Note - Bradleys parameters are normalized to zero; *** = 1% level ; ** = 5% level ; * = 10% level
Controls: sex, age, education, income, religion, race, employment status, marital status, and location
1instruments: ideological positions of rivals in the opposing partys primary
2instruments: vote share from 1896 election, avg. voter ideology from other voting markets
3the full model is run on a sub-sample of voters who have extreme ideological preferences
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Table A1: Relationship between Instruments and Ideology Measures
Dependent Variables
Voter Gore Bush Bradley McCain
McCain1 - -16.01** - -9.73 -
(8.02) (7.16)
Bradley1 - - 10.65** - -2.94
(4.63) (6.66)
Bush1 - - - 8.26 -
(5.40)
Gore1 - - - - -0.355
(4.51)
Bryan vote share 0.797 0.899 -0.658 0.552 0.722*
in 18962 (0.518) (0.605) (0.521) (0.517) (0.472)
Bryan vote share 26.35** 31.33 -33.15** 2.12 4.91
in 18961 (10.87) (20.36) (14.76) (17.92) (13.51)
Voter -6.48*** 8.93* -6.33* 1.29 2.97
Ideology1 (2.52) (4.93) (3.88) (4.82) (3.52)
Constant 10.43 6.38 1.35 3.45 3.40
(7.38) (7.98) (7.24) (6.84) (6.57)
R2 7.13% 7.01% 7.10% 8.75% 3.47%
Note -1uses information from outside voters FIPS location;
2uses information from within voters FIPS location
voters socio-demographic variables are used in all regresssions
standard errors in parentheses; *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level
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Figure 1 - Histogram of voter ideology and mean perception of candidatespolicy positions.
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